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23: SUICIDOLOGY AND THE 
RIGHT TO DIE
M argaret P. B a ttin
A s suicidology reflects on the issue o f  the right to d ie, it can make no bigger 
mistake than by seeing suicide and suicidal behavior in short-sighted isolation, 
without reference to the cultural context within which it occurs. T w o kinds of 
m yopia currently afflict us in particularly constricting ways: the refusal to see 
issues o f suicide in the context o f  larger issues about how  w e die, and the failure 
to notice substantial cultural differences in how we think about dying and the 
choices we make about dying. I think suicidology can profit considerably from  
exam ining different end-of-life practices in cultures otherwise closely related to 
our ow n, and it is for this reason that I’d like to look here at differences in 
end-of-life practices and their conceptual backgrounds in three otherwise rather 
similar countries: the Netherlands, G erm any, and the U nited  States. M uch of 
what we say about suicide and suicidal behavior in our own culture m ay look 
very different in the light o f such contrasts, and m uch o f what we do in studying  
and preventing suicide m ay be called into question in this way.
DEALING WITH DYING IN THREE ADVANCED NATIONS
T he Netherlands, G erm any, and the U nited  States are all advanced industrial 
dem ocracies. T hey  all have sophisticated m edical establishm ents and life 
expectancies over 70 years o f age; their populations are all characterized by an
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increasing proportion of older persons. They are all in what has been called the 
fourth stage of the epidemiologic transition (Olshansky and Ault 1986)—that 
stage of societal development in which it is no longer the case that most people 
die of acute parasitic or infectious diseases. In this stage, most people do not die 
of diseases with rapid, unpredictable onsets and sharp fatality curves; rather, the 
majority of the population —as much as perhaps 70-80 percent —dies of 
degenerative diseases, especially delayed degenerative diseases, that are charac­
terized by late, slow onset and extended decline. Most people in highly 
industrialized countries die from cancer, atherosclerosis, heart disease (by no 
means always suddenly fatal), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, liver, 
kidney or other organ disease, or degenerative neurological disorders. Thus, all 
three of these countries are alike in facing a common problem: how to deal with 
the characteristic new ways in which we die.
DEALING WITH DYING IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, we have come to recognize that the maximal extension of 
life-prolonging treatment in these late-life degenerative conditions is often 
inappropriate. Although we could keep the machines and tubes —the respirators, 
intravenous lines, feeding tubes —hooked up for extended periods, we recognize 
that this is inhumane, pointless, and financially impossible. Instead, as a society 
we have developed a number of mechanisms for dealing with these hopeless 
situations, all of which involve withholding or withdrawing various forms of 
treatment.
Some mechanisms for withholding or withdrawing treatment are exercised 
by the patient who is confronted by such a situation or who anticipates it; these 
include refusal of treatment, the patient-executed DNR order, the living will, 
and the durable power of attorney. Others are mechanisms for decision by 
second parties about a patient who is no longer competent or never was 
competent. The latter are reflected in a long series of court cases. These are cases 
that attempt to delineate the precise circumstances under which it is appropriate 
to withhold or withdraw various forms of therapy, including respiratory support, 
chemotherapy, antibiotics in intercurrent infections, and artificial nutrition and 
hydration. Thus, during the past 15 years or so, we have developed an 
impressive body of case law and state statute that protects, permits, and 
facilitates our characteristic American strategy of dealing with end-of-life 
situations. These cases provide a framework for withholding or withdrawing 
treatment when we believe there is no medical or moral point in going on. This 
is sometimes termed passive euthanasia; more often, it is simply called allowing 
to die, and is ubiquitous in the United States.
For example, a recent study by Miles and Gomez (1988) indicates that some 
85 percent of deaths in the United States occur in health-care institutions, 
including hospitals, nursing homes, and other facilities, and of these, about 70 
percent involve electively withholding some form of life-sustaining treatment. A
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1989 study cited in the Journal of the American Medical Association claims that 85-90 
percent of critical care professionals state that they are withholding and 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatments from patients who are “deemed to have 
irreversible disease and are terminally ill” (Sprung 1990 p. 2213). Still another 
study identified some 115 patients in two intensive-care units from whom care 
was withheld or withdrawn; 110 were already incompetent by the time the 
decision to limit care was made. The 89 who died while still in the intensive care 
unit accounted for 45 percent of all deaths there (Smedira 1990). It is estimated 
that 1.3 million American deaths a year follow decisions to withhold life support; 
this is a majority of the just over two million American deaths per year. 
Withholding and withdrawing treatment is the way we in the USA go about 
dealing with dying, and indeed “allowing to die” is the only legally protected 
alternative to maximal treatment recognized in the United States. We do not 
legally permit ourselves actively to cause death.
DEALING WITH DYING IN HOLLAND
In the Netherlands, voluntary active euthanasia is also an available response to 
end-of-life situations. Although active euthanasia remains prohibited by statu­
tory law, it is protected by a series of lower and supreme court decisions and is 
widely regarded as legal, or, more precisely, gedogen, legally tolerated. These 
court decisions have the effect of protecting the physician who performs 
euthanasia from prosecution, provided the physician meets a rigorous set of 
guidelines.
These guidelines, variously stated, contain five central provisions:
1 . that the patient’s request be voluntary;
2 . that the patient be undergoing intolerable suffering;
3. that all alternatives acceptable to the patient for relieving the suffering 
have been tried;
4. that the patient have full information;
5. that the physician have consulted with a second physician whose 
judgment can be expected to be independent.
Of these criteria, it is the first which is central: euthanasia may be 
performed only at the voluntary request of the patient. This criterion is also 
understood to require that the patient’s request be a stable, enduring, reflective 
one —not the product of a transitory impulse. Every attempt is to be made to rule 
out depression, psychopathology, pressures from family members, unrealistic 
fears, and other factors compromising voluntariness. In general, pain is not the 
principal basis for euthanasia, since pain can, in most cases, be effectively 
treated; “intolerable suffering,” understood to mean suffering that is in the 
patient’s (rather than the physician’s) view intolerable, may also include fear of 
or unwillingness to endure entluislerung, or that gradual effacement and loss of 
personal identity that characterizes the end stages of many terminal illnesses. It
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is also required that euthanasia be performed only by a physician; it may not be 
performed by a nurse, family member, or other party.
Putting an end to years of inflammatory discussion in which speculation 
about the frequency of euthanasia had run as high as twenty thousand cases a 
year, a comprehensive study requested by the Dutch government was published 
in 1991.1 This study, popularly known as the Remmelink Commission report, 
showed that about 1.8 percent of deaths in the Netherlands are the result of 
euthanasia at the explicit request of the patient with some form of physician 
involvement and about 0.3 percent of deaths involve physician-assisted suicide. 
The report of another 0.8 percent of cases of life-terminating acts without the 
explicit and persistent request of the patient has stirred enormous controversy in 
the United States, where it is often claimed that this shows that one thousand 
patients were put to death against their wishes; but what the Remmelink 
Commission in fact reports is that in these cases, although the strict criteria for 
euthanasia were not fulfilled, in more than half, euthanasia had been previously 
discussed with the patient or the patient had expressed in a previous phase of the 
disease a wish for euthanasia if his or her suffering became unbearable, and in 
virtually all the remaining cases the patients were near to death and clearly 
suffering grievously, yet verbal contact had become impossible. O f the total 
deaths in the Netherlands, the Remmelink Commission found that about 17.5 
percent involved decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment although con­
tinuing treatment would probably have prolonged life, another 17.5 percent 
involved the use of opioids to relieve pain but in dosages probably sufficient to 
shorten life (a practice ubiquitous in the U.S.), and a total of approximately 2.9 
percent involved euthanasia and related practices.
Thus, euthanasia is comparatively rare in the Netherlands, even in a 
medical climate in which, as in the U.S., medical decisions about dying are 
common; physician-assisted suicide is even rarer. Nevertheless, euthanasia is a 
conspicuous alternative to terminal illness well known to both physicians and the 
general public. Surveys of public opinion in the Netherlands show growing 
public support for a liberal euthanasia policy (increasing from 40 percent in 1966 
to 81 percent in 1988) (Borst-Eilers 1991), and whereas there is a vocal minority 
opposed to the practice (including a group of about one thousand physicians), it 
is apparent that both the majority of the population in Holland and the majority 
of Holland’s physicians support it. The Remmelink Commission found that 54 
percent of physicians had performed euthanasia or assisted in suicide (though the 
percentage is highest [62 percent] among general practitioners and lowest [12 
percent] among nursing home physicians), and an additional 34 percent said that 
although they had not practiced euthanasia or assisted in suicide, they could 
conceive of situations in which they would be prepared to do so. The
‘A summary of the findings is available in English in P. J . van der Maas, J . J .  M. van Delden, L. 
Pijnenborg, and C. W. N. Looman, “Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End 
of Life,” The Lancet 338 (14 September 1991): pp. 669-74.
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Commission commented, “a large majority of physicians in the Netherlands see 
euthanasia as an accepted element of medical practice under certain circum­
stances,” (van der Maas et al. 1991) though these circumstances are compar­
atively rare.
In Holland, many hospitals now have protocols for the performance of 
euthanasia; these serve to ensure that the court-established guidelines have been 
met. However, it is believed that most euthanasia is practiced in the patient’s 
home, typically by the huisarts, or general practitioner, who is the patient’s 
long-term family physician. Euthanasia is usually performed after aggressive 
hospital treatment has failed to arrest the patient’s terminal illness; the patient 
has come home to die, and the family physician is prepared to ease this passing. 
Whether practiced at home or in the hospital, it is believed that euthanasia 
usually takes place in the presence of the family members, perhaps the visiting 
nurse, and often, the patient’s pastor or priest. Many doctors say that per­
forming euthanasia is never easy, but that it is something they believe a doctor 
ought to do for his or her patient when nothing else can help.
Thus, in Holland, a patient facing the end of life has an option not openly 
practiced in the United States: to ask the physician to bring his or her life to an 
end. Although not everyone does so —indeed, of people who die in a given year, 
at least 97 percent do not —it is a choice widely understood as available.
FACING DEATH IN GERMANY
In part because of its very painful history of Nazism, Germany appears to 
believe that doctors should have no role in causing death. Although societal 
generalizations are always risky, it is fair, I think, to say that there is vigorous 
and nearly universal opposition in Germany to the notion of active euthanasia. 
Euthanasia is viewed as always wrong, and the Germans view the Dutch as 
stepping out on a dangerously slippery slope.
However, it is an artifact of German law that, whereas killing on request 
(including voluntary euthanasia) is prohibited, assisting suicide —where the 
person committing suicide is determined to do so —is not a violation of the law. 
Taking advantage of this situation, there has developed a private organization, 
the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Humanes Sterben (DGHS), or German Society for 
Humane Dying, which provides support to its very extensive membership in 
choosing suicide as an alternative to terminal illness.
Founded in 1980, by September 1991 the DGHS had grown to some fifty 
thousand members, and has been adding new members at the rate of one 
thousand per month. Many of its members are already elderly or terminally ill. 
After a person has been a member of the organization for at least a year, he or 
she may request a copy of DGHS’s booklet Menschenwurdiges und selbstverantwort- 
liches Sterben, or “Dignified and Responsible Death,” which is not commercially 
available. The DGHS does not charge for this booklet. The booklet itself 
includes a statement of the conditions under which it is obtainable — including
the requirement that the member has not received medical or psychotherapeutic 
treatment for depression or other psychiatric illness during the last 2 years. Each 
copy is numbered; the member is urged to keep track of it, not to give it to third 
parties, and not to make public its contents in any other way. The booklet is to 
be returned to DGHS after the member’s death. The DGHS reports approxi­
mately two thousand to three thousand suicides per year among its members.
The specific advice provided in the DGHS’s booklet contains, among other 
things, a list of ten drugs available by prescription in Germany, mostly 
barbiturates and chloroquines, together with the specific dosages necessary for 
producing a painless, nonviolent death. (Although the DGHS was originally 
associated with the provision of cyanide, it no longer publicly recommends this.) 
In addition to the drugs that will produce death, the booklet lists companion 
drugs for preventing vomiting and for inducing sedation. It also lists drugs 
available without prescription in other European countries (some just a few 
hours drive from parts of Germany), including France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
and Greece. DGHS recommends that the member approach a physician for a 
prescription for the drug of choice, asking, for example, for a barbiturate to help 
with sleeping or chloroquine for protection against malaria on a trip to India. 
Where this deception is difficult or impossible, the DGHS may also arrange for 
someone to obtain drugs from a country where they are available without 
prescription. In unusual cases, it will also provide what it calls Sterbebegleitung, or 
accompaniment in dying: this is provided by a companion who will remain with 
the person during the time that is required for the lethal drug to take full effect, 
often as much as 10 to 12 hours or longer. However, the DGHS now urges that 
family members or friends, rather than DGHS staff or members, provide 
accompaniment, and has recently inaugurated an Akademie der Sterbebegleitung, or 
Academy of Accompaniment in Dying, to train such persons in what to expect 
and how to be supportive.
DGHS also supports refusal of treatment, where that is what the patient 
wishes, and in general attempts to protect a broad range of patients’ rights. It 
provides members with a series of forms, including copies of Germany’s version 
of the living will and durable power of attorney. In the format provided by the 
DGHS, both of these forms not only stipulate health care choices or persons 
empowered to make them on behalf of a no-longer-competent patient, but they 
also include provisions authorizing the DGHS to take legal action against any 
person or organization (that is, any physician or hospital) that refuses to honor 
the patient’s antecedently stipulated wishes. For those who choose suicide as a 
way of bringing their lives to an end, the DGHS also provides a form intended 
to provide clear evidence both of the considered nature of that choice and to 
dispel any suspicion of foul play. The form —printed on a single sheet of 
distinctive pink paper —is to be signed once when the person joins the DGHS, 
asserting that he or she is a member of the organization and that he or she wishes 
to exercise the right to determine the time of his or her death; the same form is
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to be signed again at the time of the suicide —presumably, at least a year later — 
and to be left beside the body.
DGHS also relies heavily on its network of regional bureaus to encourage 
and facilitate feedback. Since assisting suicide is not illegal in Germany, there is 
no legal risk for an individual in soliciting information about suicide or in that 
person’s family reporting back information about methods of suicide attempted 
or used. DGHS attempts to keep very careful track of its members’ experiences 
with the information it provides, and uses this feedback to revise and update its 
drug recommendations. To facilitate this, the drug information provided in its 
booklet is printed on a separate sheet inserted in a slip pocket inside the back 
cover, and this list of current recommendations is revised and updated on a 
monthly basis. DGHS thus claims to be able to do what is much riskier in 
countries where assisting suicide is illegal: to make extensive use of feedback 
about actual methods of suicide. In mid-1991, when the Hemlock Society’s 
president Derek Humphry’s book Final Exit (1991) hit the top of the New York 
Times how-to best-seller list, DGHS president Hans Henning Atrott complained 
that the American book’s information wasn’t fully reliable: it was based, Atrott 
claimed, on published toxicological information, or information about what 
drug doses might prove sufficiently toxic to cause death, and not on empirical 
information about what drug doses would be certain to cause death. Because of 
the quite different legal situation in Germany, DGHS is able to collect reports 
about its own members’ suicides and thus to adjust its drug recommendations on 
the basis of actual experience. Humphry replied that he gets just as much 
information from the forty seven thousand members of the Hemlock Society, 
including explicit information about suicide deaths from patients’ families, from 
doctors, and even occasionally from patients whose suicide attempts were not 
fatal, but it is clear that such information is collected in a very different climate 
in the U.S. Fearing that they would be subpoenaed, the Hemlock Society was 
forced several years ago to burn first-person reports from a sizable number of 
physicians of cases of euthanasia they had performed or suicide in which they 
had assisted.
Even though assistance in suicide is not illegal in Germany, the DGHS 
remains controversial, though criticism is often directed against the person of its 
founder and not against the principle of assistance in suicide itself. Late in 1991, 
Hans Henning Atrott was accused of selling cyanide to an attorney hospitalized 
for mental illness, and in May 1992 police raided his office, finding capsules of 
cyanide, barbiturates, and a large amount of cash. What the outcome of this 
scandal will be remains, at this writing, to be seen, though the point of criticism 
clearly has to do with Atrott’s alleged profiteering and assisting a mentally ill 
person, rather than with the DGHS’s practice of assisting competent terminally 
ill individuals in suicide.
The existence of the DGHS is made possible by a distinctive feature of 
German law, a feature in which German law differs from that of England, the
Suicidology and the Right to Die 383
384 CHAPTER 23
U.S., the Netherlands, and most of Europe. During the Middle Ages in most of 
Europe suicide was a felony punishable by desecration of the corpse, burial at a 
crossroads, forfeiture of the decedent’s estate to the crown, and, in some 
instances, execution if the suicide attempt was not fatal. Suicide was decrimi­
nalized in England and Wales only in 1961, primarily for the purpose of 
permitting medical and psychiatric treatment without criminal onus for those 
who had attempted suicide. In contrast, suicide was decriminalized in Germany 
by Frederick the Great in 1751. Assisting suicide is not a crime in Germany 
either, provided that the person about to commit suicide is tatherrschaftsfahig, that 
is, capable of exercising control over his or her actions, and also that he or she 
acts out of jreiverantwortliche Wille, or freely responsible choice. Thus, while 
assisting the suicide of a disturbed, depressed, or demented person, or a person 
coerced by external forces, would not be permitted under German law, it is 
permitted to aid an informed, voluntary suicide, including what we might be 
tempted to call a rational suicide. However, killing upon request —the act 
involved in euthanasia —is prohibited under German law.
To be sure, the details of German law on these points have been receiving 
extended discussion, especially with respect to the apparent conflict between the 
fact that assisted suicide is not illegal but that there may be a duty to rescue a 
suicide in progress. Like U.S. law, German law imposes an obligation to rescue 
upon specific parties standing in certain professional or personal relationships to 
other persons; this is the basis of the physician’s legal duty to rescue his or her 
patient. Thus, as one widely prevalent interpretation of the legal situation holds, 
although the physician is not prohibited from giving a lethal drug to a patient, 
once that patient has taken the drug and becomes unconscious, the physician 
incurs a duty to resuscitate him or her.3
These provisions of German law —all currently highly controversial —have 
the effect of curtailing the role of German physicians in suicide, and tend to 
insulate the patient from physician aid. Thus, German law reinforces a posture 
that might also seem to be a product of fear of euthanasia and suspicion of 
authoritarian physicians: in Germany, taking death into one’s own hands in these 
contexts is an individual, private matter, to be conducted outside the medical 
establishment and largely without its help. This is not to say that the provisions 
of German law are the product of studied judicial deliberation or current 
political consensus; they are often viewed as an artifact of earlier times. In any 
case, although it apparently would not be illegal for physicians to assist in the
See Volker Krey, “Totung durch Zulassen eines Selbstmordes” [Killing by allowing a suicide to 
occur], Strafreckl Besonderer Teil, vol. 1, 7th edition (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1972, 1989), pp. 35-37.
3See Volker Krey, Euthanasie nach deutschem Strafrecht —Strafrechtlich Probleme der Sterbehilfe 
fur unheilbar Erkrankte [Euthanasia according to the German criminal law: the problem of 
aid-in-dying for the terminally ill], in 5. Europaischer Kongress fur humanes Sterben, ( A u g s b u r g :  
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur humanes Sterben e.V., 1985), pp. 145-50, and also the previously cited 
work.
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initiation of their patients’ suicides, as a matter of practice they do not do so. 
There is some move to suggest that the obligation to rescue extends beyond the 
physician to a spouse, friend, or any person with knowledge of a suicide in 
progress, but this is currently an extremely controversial issue in German law.
That neither suicide nor assisted suicide are illegal under German law does 
not mean that there can be no attempts to prevent suicide. Indeed, Germany has 
an active organization for suicide prevention, the Deutsche Gesellschaft fu r Suizid- 
pravention (the German Society for Suicide Prevention), which directs its 
attention in particular to recognizing suicidal tendencies in disturbed, depressed, 
or demented persons —that is, persons who cannot be said to be in control of 
their actions and who are not exhibiting freely responsible choice. Since, of 
course, it is not always possible to determine in advance whether a given person’s 
suicide might count as in control or not in control, or as the product or not the 
product of freely responsible choice, in practice Germany’s suicide prevention 
efforts look very much like those elsewhere, and are generally directed across the 
board at preventing suicide.4
To be sure, assisted suicide is not the only option open to the terminally ill 
in Germany; nor is it, apparently, particularly frequent. There is increasing 
emphasis on help in dying that does not involve direct termination, and 
organizations like Omega, offering hospice-style care and an extensive program 
of companionship, are attracting increasing attention. Nevertheless, the DGHS 
is a conspicuous organization, and many Germans appear to be aware that this 
alternative is available even if they do not use it.
OBJECTIONS TO THE THREE MODELS OF DYING
In response to the dilemmas raised by the new circumstances of death, in which 
the majority of the population in each of the advanced industrial nations dies of 
degenerative diseases after an extended period of terminal deterioration, 
different countries develop different practices. The United States legally permits 
only withholding and withdrawal of treatment, though of course active eutha­
nasia and assisted suicide do occur. Holland also permits voluntary active 
euthanasia, and although Germany rejects euthanasia, it tolerates assisted 
suicide. But there are serious moral objections to be made to each of these 
practices, objections to be considered before resolving the issue of which practice 
our own culture ought to adopt.
Objections to the German Practice
German law does not prohibit assisting suicide, but postwar German culture 
discourages physicians from taking any active role in death. This gives rise to
4See, however, Hermann Pohlmeier, Selbstmord und Selbslmordverhiitung [Suicide and suicide preven­
tion] (Munich: Urban & Schwartzenberg, 1983) for a discussion of suicide and suicide prevention 
that also considers the relationship of suicidc prevention to issues about freedom to choose suicide; 
a briefer statement can be found in his editorial, “Suicide and Euthanasia —Special Types of Partner 
Relationships,” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, 15, no. 2(198o): 117—123.
distinctive moral problems in Germany’s practices. For one thing, it appears that 
there is little professional help or review provided for patients’ choices about 
suicide; because the patient makes this choice essentially outside the medical 
establishment, medical professionals are not in a position to detect or treat 
impaired judgment on the part of the patient, especially judgment impaired by 
depression. Similarly, if the patient must commit suicide assisted only by persons 
outside the medical profession, there are risks that the patient’s diagnosis and 
prognosis are inadequately confirmed, that the means chosen for suicide will be 
unreliable or inappropriately used, that the means used for suicide will fall into 
the hands of other persons, and that the patient will fail to recognize or be able 
to resist intrafamilial pressures and manipulation. The DGHS policy for 
providing assistance requires that the patient be terminally ill and have been a 
member of the DGHS for at least one year in order to make use of its services, 
the latter requirement apparently intended to provide evidence of the stability of 
such a choice, but these minimal requirements are hardly sufficient to answer the 
charge that suicide decisions, which are made for medical reasons but must be 
made without medical help, may be rendered under less than ideally informed 
and voluntary conditions.
Whether Germany’s different cultural and linguistic climate, as we shall 
explore in a moment, protects these decisions in other ways remains to be seen.
Objections to the Dutch Practice
The Dutch practice of physician-performed active voluntary euthanasia also 
raises a number of ethical issues, many of which have been discussed vigorously 
both in the Dutch press and in commentary on the Dutch practices from abroad. 
For one thing, it is sometimes said that the availability of physician-performed 
euthanasia creates a disincentive for providing good terminal care. I have seen 
no evidence that this is the case; on the contrary, Peter Admiraal, the 
anesthesiologist who is perhaps Holland’s most vocal proponent of voluntary 
active euthanasia, insists that pain should rarely or never be the case for 
euthanasia, since pain (in contrast to suffering) is comparatively easily treated 
(Admiraal 1990). Instead, it is a refusal to endure the final stages of deteriora­
tion, both mental and physical, that motivates requests.
It is also sometimes said that active euthanasia violates the Hippocratic 
Oath. Indeed, it is true that the original Greek version of the Oath prohibits the 
physician from giving a deadly drug, even when asked for it; but the original 
version also prohibits performing surgery and taking fees for teaching medicine, 
neither of which prohibitions has survived into contemporary medical practice. 
Dutch physicians often say that they see performing euthanasia —where it is 
genuinely requested by the patient and nothing else can be done to relieve the 
patient’s suffering —as part of their duty to the patient, not as a violation of it.
The Dutch are also often said to be at risk of starting down the slippery
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slope, that is, that the practice of voluntary active euthanasia for patients who 
meet the criteria will erode into practicing less-than-voluntary euthanasia on 
patients whose problems are not irremediable, and perhaps by gradual degrees 
develop into terminating the lives of people who are elderly, chronically ill, 
handicapped, mentally retarded, or otherwise regarded as undesirable. This risk 
is often expressed in vivid claims of widespread fear and wholesale slaughter, 
claims that are repeated in the right-to-life press in both Holland and the USA; 
however, these claims are simply not true and as we have seen, the vast majority 
of the Dutch favor current practices. However, it is true that the Dutch are now 
beginning to agonize over the problems of the incompetent patient, the mentally 
ill patient, the newborn with serious deficits, and other patients who cannot 
make voluntary choices, though these are largely understood as issues about 
withholding or withdrawing treatment, not about direct termination (Ten Have 
1990). In the rare cases where direct termination is practiced, these are not 
understood as euthanasia, but as a distinct form of levensbeeindigend handelen, or 
life-ending treatment.
What is not often understood is that this new and acutely painful area of 
reflection for the Dutch —withholding and withdrawing treatment from incom­
petent patients —has already led in the United States to the development of a 
vast, highly developed body of law: the series of cases beginning with Quinlan and 
culminating in Cruzan. Americans have been discussing these issues for a long 
time, and have developed a broad set of practices that are regarded as routine in 
withholding and withdrawing treatment. The Dutch see Americans as much 
further out on the slippery slope than they are, because Americans have already 
become accustomed to second-party choices. Issues involving second-party 
choices are painful to the Dutch in a way they are not to us precisely because 
voluntariness is so central in the Dutch understanding of choices about dying. 
Concomitantly, the Dutch see the Americans’ squeamishness about first-party 
choices —voluntary euthanasia, assisted suicide —as evidence that we are not 
genuinely committed to recognizing voluntary choice after all. For this reason, 
many Dutch commentators believe that the Americans are at a much greater risk 
of sliding down the slippery slope into involuntary killing than they are. I fear, 
I must add, that they are right about this.
Objections to the American Practice
There may be moral problems raised by the German and the Dutch practices, 
but there are also moral problems raised by the American practice of relying on 
withholding and withdrawal of treatment in end-of-life situations. The German, 
Dutch, and American practices all occur within similar conditions —in industri­
alized nations with highly developed medical systems, where a majority of the 
population dies of illnesses exhibiting characteristically extended downhill 
courses —but the issues raised by our own response to this situation may be even 
more disturbing than those of the Dutch or the Germans. We often assume that
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our approach is safer because it involves only letting someone die, not killing him 
or her; but it too raises very troubling questions.
The first of these issues is a function of the fact that withdrawing and 
especially withholding treatment are typically less conspicuous, less pronounced, 
less evident kinds of actions than direct killing, even though they can equally well 
lead to death. Decisions about nontreatment have an invisibility that decisions 
about directly causing death do not have, even though they may have the same 
result, and hence there is a much wider range of occasions in which such 
decisions can be made. One can decline to treat a patient in many different ways, 
at many different times —by not providing oxygen, by not instituting dialysis, by 
not correcting electrolyte imbalances, and so on —all of which will cause the 
patient’s death; open medical killing also brings about death, but is a much more 
overt, conspicuous procedure. Consequently, letting die also invites many fewer 
protections. In contrast to the earlier slippery slope argument, which sees killing 
as riskier than letting die, the slippery slope argument here warns that because 
our culture relies primarily on decisions about nontreatment, grave decisions 
about living or dying are not as open to scrutiny as they are under more direct 
life-terminating practices, and hence, are more open to abuse.
Second, and closely related, reliance on withholding and withdrawal of 
treatment invites rationing in an extremely strong way, in part because of the 
comparative invisibility of these decisions. When a health-care provider does not 
offer a specific sort of care, it is not always possible to discern the motivation; the 
line between believing that it would not provide benefit to the patient and that 
it would not provide benefit worth the investment of resources in the patient can 
be very thin. This is a particular problem where health-care financing is highly 
decentralized, as in the United States, and where rationing decisions without 
benefit of principle are not always available for easy review.
Third, relying on withholding and withdrawal of treatment can often be 
cruel. It requires that the patient who is dying from one of the diseases that 
exhibits a characteristic extended, downhill course (as the majority of patients 
in Holland, Germany, and the U.S. do) must in effect wait to die until the 
absence of a certain treatment will cause death. For instance, the cancer patient 
who forgoes chemotherapy or surgery does not simply die from this choice; he 
or she continues to endure the downhill course of the cancer until the tumor 
finally destroys some crucial bodily function or organ. The patient with 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis who decides in advance to decline respiratory 
support does not die at the time this choice is made, but continues to endure 
increasing paralysis until breathing is impaired and suffocation occurs. We 
often try to ameliorate these situations by administering pain medication or 
symptom control at the same time we are withholding treatment, but these are 
all ways of disguising the fact that we are letting the disease kill the patient 
rather than directly bringing about death. But the ways diseases kill people are 
far more cruel than the ways physicians kill patients when performing 
euthanasia or assisting in suicide.
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LANGUAGE AND CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES 
IN THE WAY WE DIE
But to describe difference in end-of-life practices in three otherwise similar 
cultures is not yet to show why these differences are possible. To understand how 
these cultures can variously accept or reject active euthanasia, assistance in 
suicide, and withdrawing and withholding of treatment, it is necessary to see 
several conceptual distinctions at the root of these practices.
Differing Senses of the Term Euthanasia
In attempting to disentangle disagreement about the issues in euthanasia, and to 
explain how it can be so broadly accepted in one European culture, the 
Netherlands, so strongly rejected in an immediately neighboring one, Germany, 
and viewed with such ambivalence in American culture, it is essential to see that 
the term is used in two quite different senses. On the one hand, there is the 
sense, based heavily on the Greek etymology, eu-thanatos, or good death, that 
euthanasia is in the interests of the person whose death it is; it is better than the 
death this person would otherwise meet. In the Netherlands, euthanasia is 
understood in this way, but there is an additional component: it is understood 
that the wish of the patient is central, and that a death cannot be a good one 
which is not in concert with the wish of the patient. Hence, in the Netherlands, 
euthanasia is understood to mean, by definition, voluntary euthanasia —or, as the 
authors of the Remmelink Commission report put it, “the intentional termina­
tion of life by somebody other than the person concerned at his or her request” 
(p. 669).
In Germany, in contrast, the term euthanasia is characteristically under­
stood in a way associated with the abuses by the Nazis: here, euthanasia has 
nothing to do with good death or death that is in the interests of the person 
concerned and preferable in that person’s eyes to the death he or she might 
otherwise meet, but an ostensibly medical procedure performed for ulterior, 
nonmedical ends. The corruption of the term euthanasia began with the 
infamous T4 program, begun by Hitler in 1939, in which chronically ill, 
retarded, and handicapped Aryans were selected for this “benefit” though they 
were neither already dying nor had made any request to die (Lifton 1986). The 
T4 program increasingly moved to the involuntary selection of those determined 
unfit for work or who failed other tests of function. The T4 program was 
discontinued at the protests of both the Catholic and Protestant churches in 
1941, but the personnel from this program were reassigned to the newly opened 
concentration camps, where they continued to perform killings of persons 
deemed unfit for various reasons. With the T4 personnel went not only their 
technology but the term “euthanasia,” and it became firmly associated with Nazi 
medical experimentation and genocide. In Germany today, the term still retains 
this association with Nazi brutality and the involuntary killing of people for 
wholly nonmedical reasons. Indeed, so strong is the stink of the word “euthana­
sia” that protest groups have organized to suppress the discussion of it even in 
settings like academic bioethics conferences.
Thus, we can identify two distinct, wholly different senses of the term 
euthanasia, and note that they are used in these quite opposite ways in two 
adjoining European countries. While the Dutch accept euthanasia in the 
voluntary, self-benefitting sense they have in mind, the Germans reject eutha­
nasia in the involuntary, politically motivated, essentially Nazi sense they have 
in mind. Meanwhile, in the United States, discussions of the issues in euthanasia 
shift back and forth between these two quite distinct senses. The result is a 
general failure to communicate and, consequently, continuing political friction.
Multiple Senses of Suicide
Background conceptual issues are even more apparent in the matter of the 
language we use for self-caused death, and failure to understand the differences 
among different cultures may produce even more confusion.
In current usage, English provides one principal term to denote self-caused 
death: suicide. In contrast to English’s primary reliance on a single term, Ger­
man employs several distinct ones: the traditional terms Selbstmord and Selbst- 
totung, the scientific term Suizid, and the literary Freitod. Selbstmord and Selbsttotung 
are the analogues of the English terms self-murder (also self-murther) and self-killing, 
which were in widespread use in English during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries; in English these terms were eventually supplanted by the Latinate 
suicide and have virtually disappeared from contemporary use. The German 
terms both remain current. The German Selbstmord, the term most frequently 
used in ordinary spoken and written discourse, carries extremely negative 
connotations, no doubt associated with its literal meaning, self-murder, in­
cluding the implication of moral wrong. In partial contrast, Selbsttotung, literally 
self-killing, has connotations that are comparatively neutral in their factual 
quality but still decidedly negative, just as killing is neutral in English com­
pared to murder but still decidedly negative. Selbsttotung is used primarily in 
bureaucratic and legal contexts. The German term Suizid, linguistically analo­
gous to the English term, also literally means self-killing, but is comparatively 
neutral in its moral connotations; it conveys an implication of psychiatric 
pathology and is the technical term characteristically used by clinicians and 
researchers. While these terms are primarily found in their conversational,
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^See Peter Singer, “On Being Silenced in Germany,” The New York Review of Books, 15 August 1991, 
pp. 36-42, and Bettina Schone-Seifert and Klaus-Peter Rippe, “Silencing the Singer: Antibioethics 
in Germany,” Hastings Center Report 21 no. 6 (1991):20—27, for accounts of responses to discussion of 
euthanasia and other topics. Also see the more comprehensive volume Zur Debatte iiber Eulhanasie [On 
the debate over euthanasia], ed. Rainer Hegselmann and Reinhard Merkel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
Verlag 1991), containing much of the discussion as well as responses to it. An example of the 
opposition is to be found in Christian Stadler, Sterbehilfe—gestern und heuie [Aid-in-dying: yesterday 
and today] (Bonn: Psychiatrie-Verlag, 1991).
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bureaucratic, and clinical applications respectively, they are also sometimes used 
interchangeably.
German’s fourth term for self-caused death, however, is quite another 
matter. Freitod (literally free death or voluntary death) is a positive term, free 
from connotations of either moral wrongness or pathology; it also avoids the 
drabness of bureaucratic facticity. It is associated with voluntary individual 
choice and the expression of basic, strongly held personal values or ideals, 
especially those running counter to conventional societal norms, and suggests the 
triumph of personal integrity in the face of threat or shame. Freitod has an 
archaic flavor, often associated with Romanticism, and would not generally be 
used in ordinary conversation; however, it is readily recognizable to most 
speakers. But while the most common term for suicide, Selbstmord, and the 
comparatively uncommon literary one, Freitod, both refer to the act of bringing 
about one’s own death, they have very different connotations and describe what 
are understood to be quite different sorts of acts. Selbstmord is taken to involve a 
generally repugnant, tragic act, generally associated with despair, anger, or 
depression; Freitod, in contrast, is seen as expressing voluntary, idealistic choice. 
Even the verbs used with the different German terms for suicide reinforce their 
semantic differences: one “commits” Selbstmord (man begeht Selbstmord), but one 
“chooses” Freitod (man wahlt den Freitod). It is not grammatically possible to speak 
either of “choosing” Selbstmord or of “committing” Freitod.
To be sure, both English and German also offer a variety of peripheral 
terms to refer to suicide —for example, English’s self-destruction and the archaic 
self-slaughter; German’s Selbstentleibung (literally, self-disembodiment), all terms 
with strong connotations of violence, as well as an assortment of verbal 
expressions, many of which appear in similar forms in both English and 
German, sich das Leben nehmen (take one’s own life), and often make reference to 
the means of death employed: sich erhdngen (hang oneself), sich erschiessen (shoot 
oneself), sich ertranken (drown oneself), and so on. But the central contrast lies in 
the difference between English’s current reliance on a single principal term — 
suicide —and German’s routine use of several different terms, especially Selbst­
mord, Selbsttotung, Suizid, and Freitod. Despite its comparative archaism and 
infrequent usage, this last term, Freitod, plays an especially significant role and 
is crucial to understanding the nature of institutionalized assisted-suicide 
practices in contemporary Germany.
The term Freitod is often thought by educated Germans to date from the 
eighteenth century, emerging around the same time that Frederick the Great was 
decriminalizing suicide. The term seems particularly associated with the Sturm 
und Drang, or storm and stress, movement in German literature, especially the 
plays of Goethe and Schiller — plays read, of course, by German students during 
their high-school years. Perhaps the most familiar, celebrated example of Freitod 
in German literature would be said to be the death of Goethe’s character 
Werther, the hero of his 1774 novella The Sorrows of Young Werther. In this 
compelling tale, a projection of Goethe’s own ill-fated love affair with Charlotte
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Buff, Werther chooses to end his own life rather than sink from a condition of 
extraordinary sensitivity and sensibility into the respectable tedium of everyday 
life.6
Curiously, however, etymological sources do not actually trace the word 
Freitod as far back as Goethe; rather, they find that it originates with the title 
of Section 22 of Nietzsche’s Also Sprach Zarathustra (1883), Vom Freien Tode 
(variously translated “On free death” or “On voluntary death”) . 7 In this work, 
Nietzsche develops the notion of Ubermensch, or superman, a concept later 
misunderstood and appropriated by National Socialism, and asserts a central 
teaching of Zarathustra: “Die at the right time.” Meinen Tod lobe ich euch, den freien 
Tod, der mir komml, weil ich will, says Zarathustra —“My death, praise I unto me 
because I  want it” (p. 75). The death to be avoided is the “common, withered, 
patient death” of those who are “like sour apples”: their lot is to “wait until the 
last day of autumn: and at the same time they become ripe, yellow, and 
shrivelled” (p. 75). The death that Zarathustra preaches is an active, extra­
ordinary, heroic death, an earlier, self-willed death of which the ordinary man 
is hardly capable.
Perhaps because of the association of Nietzsche’s Ubermensch with Nazism, 
Freitod, with its quite positive connotations, is rarely thought to originate there, 
and is instead attributed, erroneously, to the pre-Romantic ideal. But the term 
is not found in either Goethe or Schiller, and, indeed, the single term, Freitod, is 
not even found in Nietzsche, though it originates from Nietzsche’s two-word 
phrase.8 Yet, however problematic its actual origins, the term does have a 
distinctive, well-recognized sense in contemporary German: although it refers to 
the act of bringing about one’s own death, it does not convey the very negative 
moral connotations associated with Selbslmord, the factual but still negative 
connotations of Selbsttotung, or the pathological ones associated with Suizid. On 
the contrary, the connotations of the term Freitod are wholly positive: achieving 
this kind of death is an admirable, heroic —if very difficult —thing to do.
There is no analogous term in English. While there have been recent 
attempts at coinages in English (for example, self-deliverance) to describe suicide
Considerable critical discussion has been devoted to the issue of whether Werther’s death —depicted 
as resulting a dozen hours after a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head, clearly involving 
considerable suffering, is really intended by Goethe as a pure example of Freitod, or whether, on the 
contrary, it is a parody of it or warning against it. The publication of The Sorrows of Young Werther did 
lead to a rash of copycat suicides among young men, many of whom were dressed in clothing similar 
to Werther’s —a blue waistcoat and a yellow vest.
Friedrich Kluge, Elymologisches Worlerbuch dir deuischen Sprache [Etymological dictionary of the 
German language], (Berlin: DeGruyter, 1989), p. 231. See also Karl Baumann’s remarkable 
dissertation on the development of the terms Selbstmord and Freitod: Selbslmord und Freitod in 
sprachlicher und geisUsgeschichllicher Beleuchlung [suicide and free death as illuminated by linguistic and 
intellectual history] (Giessen: Dissertationsdruckerei und Verlag Konrad Triltsch, 1934), which 
includes extensive personal reflections from other linguists and over one hundred responses to a 
questionnaire about usage of these two terms.
8The first known occurrence of the single word Freitod is dated 1906, some 23 years after Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra. See Baumann, Selbstmord und Freitod, p. 13.
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but avoid that term’s negative connotations, there is no widely recognized, 
familiar English term with long historical resonances of the sort that Freitod seems 
to have. The only other English terms for suicide that do not have negative 
connotations carry either pronounced religious associations or the implication 
that the suicide serves the interest of some other person or cause: there are terms 
like self-sacrifice and martyrdom. The very concept of Freitod—& notion without 
religious, altruistic overtones and without negative moral or psychological 
implications, but which celebrates the voluntary choice of death as a personal 
expression of principled idealism —is, in short, linguistically unfamiliar to 
English speakers. Language is crucial in shaping attitudes about end-of-life 
practices, and because of the very different lexical resources of English and 
German, it is clear that English speakers cannot straightforwardly understand 
the very different German conception of these matters. Even in situations of 
terminal illness, the very concept of voluntary death resonates differently for the 
German speaker who conceives of it as Freitod than it does for the English- 
speaker who conceives of it as suicide.
Thus, while one sees in both Germany and the United States the development 
of notions of what is often called rational suicide and the conception that this may 
be a reasonable choice in terminal illness, they occur in very different cultural 
climates. In an English-speaking country like the United States, there is no 
tradition that recognizes a distinctive sort of suicide, different from immoral or 
pathological suicide, and no tradition of legal or other protection for it. Nor is 
there a similar tradition in the Netherlands. Not even among the English Ro­
mantics is there a literary model quite like Werther, whose death could readily 
be described as Freitod. The sense of the German term Freitod is simply not to be 
found in any single term in English, or in Dutch. Furthermore, it could be 
constructed in English only with comparatively clumsy circumlocutions: “suicide 
that is self-centered but without the negative connotations of either suicide or 
self-centered; “self-deliverance but with long, positive historical resonances,” and 
so on, but these paraphrases would hardly capture the rich connotative field that 
has developed around the term Freitod. This is not to say that German speakers 
are always actively aware of the history and connotations of Freitod, but that the 
German language provides resources for thinking about, expressing, and expe­
riencing choices about suicide in terminal illness in a way that English and Dutch 
do not.
Indeed, the DGHS deliberately exploits the conception of ending one’s life 
in terminal illness as Freitod rather than Selbstmord. The distinctive pink form, 
mentioned earlier, to be signed when joining the DGHS and to be signed again 
at the time of one’s final act, does not refer to that act as suicide, but as free 
death: it is labelled Freitod-Verfiigung, or free death directive. On the line just 
prior to the space for the second signature, the form reads: Ich habe heute meinen 
Freitod eingeleitet — “I have brought about my free death today.” This is the form 
that will be found beside the body. The terms Selbstmord and Suizid appear 
nowhere in this document, and the bureaucratic term Selbsttotung appears only in
the reverse side in the language of quotations from German law about the legal 
status of suicide.
It is tempting to say, then, that choices about ending life may be rather 
different for the German speaker than for the English or the Dutch speaker. If 
so, it is also plausible to suppose that choices of suicide in terminal illness, 
protected not only by legal but also by linguistic and hence conceptual supports, 
may be much easier to make in Germany than they are in the United States, 
where legal, linguistic, and conceptual structures all militate against them, and 
perhaps easier than in the Netherlands, where euthanasia is widely accepted but 
suicide seems less so. Furthermore, presumably, not only may these choices to 
suicide be easier for the German speaker to make, they may also be easier for 
survivors to accept and for the culture as a whole to acknowledge. Of course, 
there are factors in German culture that militate against suicide as well — 
religious sanctions, for example; but the picture may nevertheless be rather 
different from the one we see in the Netherlands and the United States, and it 
may be a picture that is difficult for outsiders to perceive or understand.
THE PROBLEM: A CHOICE OF CULTURES
Thus we see three similar cultures and countries and three similar sets of 
circumstances, but three quite different basic practices in approaching death. All 
three of these practices generate moral problems; none of them, nor any others 
we might devise, is free of moral difficulty. But the questions that face us are 
this: which of these practices are best, and what consequences would they have 
for altering our attitudes as suicidologists?
It is not possible to answer this question in a less-than-ideal world without 
some attention to the specific characteristics and deficiencies of the society in 
question. In asking which of these practices is best, we must ask which is best for 
us. That we currently employ one set of these practices rather than others does 
not prove that it is best for us; the question is, would practices developed in other 
cultures or those not yet widespread in any be better for our own culture than 
that which has developed here? Thus, it is necessary to consider which 
differences between our own society and these European cultures have real 
bearing on the model of approach to dying we ought to adopt.
First, notice that different cultures exhibit different degrees of closeness 
between physicians and patients —different patterns of contact and involvement. 
The German physician is sometimes said to be more distant and more 
authoritarian than the American physician. For example, although empirical 
data have yet to be published, a large study currently in progress at the 
University of Gottingen is exploring a number of hypotheses that are often said 
to characterize medical decision making .9 These center around the claim that
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Institute der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Landeskirche Hannovers. Dr. Wehkamp is currently 
involved with the study at the University of Gottingen, “Arztliche Entscheidungen in Konfliktsitua-
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decision making remains largely in the hands of the physician; while consent by 
the patient is legally required, and indeed consent forms for major procedures 
are routinely signed, neither patient understanding nor consent is much 
emphasized. In circumstances in which the patient faces oncoming death, 
according to the hypotheses of the Gottingen study, it is the physician who makes 
decisions about the initiation or withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy. In these 
decisions, the evaluations and views of nurses and other caregivers play a 
considerable role and consent is for the most part sought from the patient’s 
relatives; however, in most cases the patient, who is often no longer competent, 
is not included in decision making. For the most part, patients in the system of 
hospital care do not demand or achieve self-determination in matters of dying.
On the other hand, the Dutch physician is sometimes said to be closer to his 
or her patients than either the American or the German is. In the Netherlands, 
basic primary care is provided by the huisarts, the general practitioner or family 
physician, who typically lives in the neighborhood, makes house calls frequently, 
and maintains an office in his or her own home. The huisarts is usually the 
physician for the other members of the patient’s family, and will remain the 
family’s physician throughout his or her practice. Thus, the patient for whom 
euthanasia becomes an issue —say, the terminal cancer patient who has been 
hospitalized in the past but who has returned home to die — will be cared for by 
the trusted family physician on a regular basis. Indeed, for a patient in severe 
distress, the physician, supported by the visiting nurse, may make house calls as 
often as once or twice a day, or more (after all, it is right in the neighborhood), 
and is in continuous contact with the family. In contrast, the traditional 
American institution of the family doctor who makes house calls is rapidly 
becoming a thing of the past, and whereas some patients who die at home have 
access to hospice services and house calls from their long-term physician, many 
have no such long-term care and receive most of it from staff at a clinic or 
housestaff rotating through the services of a hospital. The degree of continuing 
contact the patient can have with a familiar, trusted physician clearly influences 
the nature of his or her dying, and also plays a role in whether physician- 
performed active euthanasia, assisted suicide, and/or withholding and with­
drawing treatment is appropriate.
Second, the United States has a much more volatile legal climate than either 
the Netherlands or Germany; our medical system is increasingly litigious, much 
more so than that of any other country in the world. Fears of malpractice action 
or criminal prosecution color much of what physicians do in managing the dying 
of their patients. We also tend to evolve public policy through court decisions, 
and to assume that the existence of a policy puts an end to any moral issue. A 
delicate legal and moral balance over the issue of euthanasia, as is the case in the 
Netherlands, would not be possible here.
tionen” [Physician decision-making in situations of conflict], which is directed by Hannes Friedrich, 
Eva Hampel, Klaus Held, Bettina Schone-Seifert, and Jurgen Wilhelm.
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Third, we in the United States have a very different financial climate in 
which to do our dying. Both the Netherlands and Germany, as well as every 
other industrialized nation except South Africa, have systems of national health 
insurance or national health care. Thus the patient is not directly responsible for 
the costs of treatment, and consequently the patient’s choices about terminal care 
and/or euthanasia need not take personal financial considerations into account. 
Even for the patient who does have health insurance in the United States, many 
kinds of services are not covered, whereas the national health care or health 
insurance programs of many other countries variously provide many sorts of 
relevant services, including at-home physician care, home-nursing care, home- 
respite care, care in a nursing-home or other long-term facility, dietician care, 
rehabilitation care, physical therapy, psychological counseling, and so on. The 
patient in the United States needs to attend to the financial aspects of dying in 
a way that patients in many other countries do not, and in this country both the 
patient’s choices and the recommendations of the physician are very often shaped 
by financial considerations.
There are many other differences between the United States on the one 
hand and the Netherlands and Germany, with their different models of dying, 
on the other. There are differences in degrees of paternalism in the medical 
establishment and in racism, sexism, and ageism in the general culture, as well 
as awareness of a problematic historical past, especially Nazism. All of these and 
the previous factors influence the appropriateness or inappropriateness of 
practices such as active euthanasia and assisted suicide. For instance, the 
Netherlands’ tradition of close physician-patient contact, its absence of malpractice- 
motivated medicine, and its provision of comprehensive health insurance, 
together with its comparative lack of racism and ageism and its experience in 
resistance to Nazism, suggest that this culture is able to permit the practice of 
voluntary active euthanasia, performed by physicians without risking abuse. On 
the other hand, it is sometimes said that Germany still does not trust its 
physicians, remembering the example of Nazi experimentation, and given a 
comparatively authoritarian medical climate in which the contact between 
physician and patient is quite distanced, the population could not be comfortable 
with the practice of active euthanasia. There, only a wholly patient-controlled 
response to terminal situations, as in non-physician-assisted suicide, is a 
reasonable and prudent practice.
But what about the United States? This is a country where 1) sustained 
contact with a personal physician is decreasing, 2) the risk of malpractice action 
is increasing, 3) much medical care is not insured, 4) many medical decisions are 
financial decisions as well, 5) racism is on the rise, and 6) the public is naive 
about direct contact with Nazism or similar totalitarian movements. Thus, the 
United States is in many respects an untrustworthy candidate for practicing 
active euthanasia. Given the pressures on individuals in an often atomized 
society, encouraging solo suicide, assisted if at all only by nonprofessionals, 
might well be open to considerable abuse, too.
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W hat, then, is appropriate for our own cultural situation? Physician- 
performed euthanasia, though not in itself morally wrong, is morally jeopar­
dized where the legal, time allotment, and especially financial pressures on both 
patients and physicians are severe; thus, it is morally problematic in our culture 
in a way that it is not in the Netherlands. Solo suicide outside the institution of 
medicine (as in Germ any) is problematic in a culture (like the U nited States) that 
is increasingly alienated, offers deteriorating and uneven social services, is 
increasingly racist, and in other ways imposes unusual pressures on individuals. 
Reliance only on withholding and withdrawing treatm ent (as in the United 
States) can be, as we’ve seen, cruel, and its comparative invisibility invites 
erosion under cost containment and other pressures. These are the three 
principal alternatives we’ve considered; but none of them seems wholly suited to 
our actual situation for dealing with the new fact that most of us die of 
extended-decline, deteriorative diseases. However, perm itting physicians to 
supply patients with the means for ending their own lives still grants physicians 
some control over the circumstances in which this can happen —only, for 
example, when the prognosis is genuinely grim and the alternatives for symptom 
control are poor—but leaves the fundam ental decision about whether to use 
these means to the patient alone. It is up to the patient then, and his or her 
advisors, including family, clergy, physician, other health-care providers, and 
perhaps a raft of self-counseling books, to be clear about whether he or she really 
wants to use these means or not. Thus, the physician is involved, but not 
directly; and it is the patient’s choice, but the patient is not alone in making it. 
W e live in a quite imperfect world, but, of the alternatives for facing death — 
which we all eventually must — I think that the practice of perm itting physician- 
assisted suicide is the one most nearly suited to the current state of our own quite 
flawed society. This is a model not yet central in any of the three countries 
examined here —the Netherlands, G erm any, or the United States —but it is the 
one I think suits us best.
Contem porary suicidology must, I think, come to terms with these realities. 
It m ust observe that different choices and background assumptions about dying 
characterize different cultures, and it m ust use these facts to reexamine the 
background assumptions of our own culture and the choices we permit and 
reject. The question of one’s own role in one’s own death will become, I think, 
the m ajor social issue of the next decade, as we consider legalizing assisted 
suicide, physician-assisted suicide, and physician-performed voluntary active 
euthanasia; and if contemporary suicidology is to rem ain the enormously 
im portant field it has become, it m ust be capable of responding openly to these 
issues.
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